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The Corporate "Person": A New Analytical
Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional
Interpretation
Jess M. Krannich *
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two hundred years, the American business corporation
has developed from a seldom-used method of doing business into the
predominant economic actor in society.' Modem business corporations2
are, on many levels, the most significant form of social organization, in
many respects more influential and pervasive than even governmental
entities. Yet, the corporate entity has consistently defied legal
definition since America's founding.3 The American legal tradition
addresses legal relationships in terms of individual actors, and focuses
primarily on interactions among individuals and between individuals
and the government.4 The Bill of Rights itself centers on protecting
individuals from government action and discusses rights in terms of the
"person" to whom they apply.5 However, the American business
corporation does not fit neatly into this framework, for a corporation is
simply not a "person" as most understand the term. To overcome this
dichotomy, corporate theorists have devised various metaphors to help
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P.; J.D., S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah;
B.S., with Honors, University of Utah. I would like to thank Professor Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
whose invaluable guidance and support made this Article possible. I would also like to thank
Meredith Krannich for providing an open ear and much-needed moral support through many
drafts of this Article.
1. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing how corporations have evolved
into the preeminent actors of modem times).
2. For the purposes of this Article, "modem business corporation" means a large,
hierarchically organized, publicly held, for-profit business corporation.
3. See infra Part II (discussing the various "personalities" corporations have taken throughout
American history).
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that the conflict between individuals and
corporations has been a recurrent theme in modem corporate law and academic studies thereof).
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (discussing the rights of a "person" to due process of
law).
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supply a legal definition for the corporate entity.6 The most common of
these metaphors are the artificial entity theory, the aggregate entity
theory, and the real entity theory, though each theory has its respective
variants.7 While these metaphors vary dramatically in their respective
foci, they all have one thing in common: each attempts to force the
corporate entity into a preexisting legal structure by way of analogy.
The use of metaphorical descriptions of the corporate entity is
especially prevalent in the Supreme Court's corporate constitutional
jurisprudence.8 The Court's decisions in this area seem to assume that a
corporation is a "person" under the Constitution and is thus entitled to
many of the same rights as a natural person.9 However, the Court has
never established a test to determine what a constitutional person is or
whether a corporation meets such a test. Instead, the Court has
continually borrowed metaphors from corporate theory to analogize the
corporate entity to the "person" protected by the Constitution.' ° These
metaphors of corporate theory are frequently deployed in an ad hoc,
arbitrary manner; different corporate metaphors have been used within
the same case, even in interpreting different portions of the same
Constitutional Amendment." The result is a foundational problem in
corporate constitutional law, for the Court has granted corporations
constitutional rights without engaging in the preliminary inquiry of
whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.
As a matter of law, the Court's jurisprudence relating to corporate
constitutional rights is fundamentally flawed.'2 In its cases addressing
corporate constitutional rights, the Court has failed to address the most
important (and preliminary) question: whether a corporation should be
entitled to the same rights as the natural person described in the
Constitution. The Court's use of metaphors to analogize the corporate
entity to a natural person ignores the most fundamental methods of
constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the Court's current
jurisprudence-with its reliance on metaphors rather than well-reasoned
6. See infra Part H (discussing several of the metaphors that commentators and jurists have
devised).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part 11I (detailing the Supreme Court's view of metaphor and the corporate
person).
9. See infra Part fI.A (discussing how the Supreme Court has consistently held that a
corporation is a "person" in constitutional analysis).
10. See infra Part M (showing that the Supreme Court has historically used metaphors in
analyzing the constitutional protections afforded to corporations).
11. Id.
12. See infra Part IV (arguing that the question of constitutional personhood should be a
threshold question in determining whether an entity is entitled to constitutional protection).
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legal rules-is inherently unstable, for corporate theory itself is
unstable. Despite hundreds of years of debate, corporate theorists have
never agreed on the proper characterization of the corporate entity.
In essence, the Court has constructed a house of cards by relying on
metaphors and theory to establish the basis of corporate constitutional
rights. Rather than allowing such a legal fiction to provide the basis for
corporate rights, the Court should examine the reasons a natural person
is granted the right at issue and determine whether those justifications
apply equally to the corporate entity. 3 In this manner, the Court would
avoid the creation of a legal fiction by ensuring at the outset that the
nature of the right is such that it logically extends to corporations.
Part II of this Article examines the use of corporate metaphors
through America's history, tracing the development of corporate theory
as well as the development of the corporate entity as a political and
social actor. 14  Three distinct metaphors of the corporate entity are
discussed: the artificial entity theory, the aggregate entity theory, and
the real entity theory. These metaphors developed more or less
coextensively and competed amongst each other in the academic
literature around the turn of the century. The Court has adopted all
three metaphors in addressing the constitutional rights of corporations,
and all three metaphors (as well as their variants) can be seen in modem
corporate constitutional jurisprudence. 5 By examining the nature of the
theories, it becomes more apparent that a corporation is not the peer of a
natural person and that the Court's use of corporate metaphors to
analogize a corporation to a natural person is constitutionally unsound.
Part III examines corporate constitutional rights in depth, canvassing
case law to demonstrate the manner in which the Court has found that
corporations are entitled to various constitutional rights. 6  This Part
addresses the Court's use of corporate theory to grant constitutional
rights to corporations and demonstrates that the Court has continually
failed to address the preliminary question of what it means to be a
constitutional person.' 7 In addition, this Part suggests a foundational
13. Though this Article explicitly argues that the current jurisprudence contains a doctrinal
error, it does not necessarily follow that corporations are not entitled to constitutional rights.
Rather, a corporation should be entitled to a constitutional right when the nature of the right at
issue justifies its extension to a corporation for the same reasons it is extended to a natural person.
This line of reasoning is taken up in further depth infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the various theories and metaphors applied to
corporations).
15. See infra Part III (demonstrating that the AE theory, AENTITY theory and the RE theory
have all been adopted at some point by the Supreme Court).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part III.A (showing that the Court has never examined in detail the meaning of a
2005]
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problem in the Court's corporate constitutional jurisprudence by using
different corporate metaphors to force the corporate entity into the
individualistic framework of the Constitution, the Court has adopted an
ad hoc, result-oriented approach to corporate rights, which is difficult to
reconcile with traditional modes of constitutional interpretation.
Finally, Part IV of this Article suggests an alternative framework for
addressing corporate constitutional rights."8 An examination of the
values and policies underlying each constitutional right should be a
threshold matter before a corporation is treated as a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Such an examination would avoid the
adoption of debated corporate metaphors into constitutional
jurisprudence and would parallel traditional methods of constitutional
interpretation. By examining the values and policies underlying each
right, the Court would ensure that corporations are not granted
constitutional rights meant only for individual citizens. Rather, a
corporation would only be granted a constitutional right if the reasons a
natural person is entitled to the right apply equally to a corporation. If
this test were not met, constitutional rights could then be extended to
corporations through the traditional amendment process, allowing for
debate and discussion. This approach would prevent modern business
corporations, which are simply not analogous to natural persons, from
being treated in a manner not intended by the law.
II. CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND PERSONHOOD
Since our nation's founding, the development of corporate theory has
dovetailed with the development of corporations as economic and social
actors. At our nation's founding, corporations were viewed as mere
legal creations of the state, with only the limited powers granted to them
by the state." Business was generally conducted by single
proprietorships and partnerships; those corporations that did exist were
those created by the state to accomplish public functions.20 In contrast,
modern business corporations are the preeminent economic actors in our
society, operating largely in conformity with their own bylaws, rather
corporate "person").
18. See infra Part IV (proposing that before treating a corporation as a person, courts should
first identify the underlying purpose of the constitutional right sought).
19. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283, 292-93 (1990). In fact, no significant business corporations even existed
until the railroad corporations became prominent late in the nineteenth century. Id. at 294.
20. Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1443-44 (1987) (footnote omitted) (discussing use of
early corporations by the state to perform public functions such as construction projects).
[Vol. 37
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than at the whim of the state. Corporations have attained such power in
our modem political economy that "[t]he corporation, once the
derivative tool of the state, ha[s] become its rival.' Modem business
corporations "may be regarded not simply as one form of social
organization but ... as the dominant institution of the modem world. 22
Many commentators believe that the modem business corporation is
such a powerful, pervasive entity that it should be viewed as a quasi-
governmental body.23 For example, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means,
who revolutionized corporate theory with their expansive view of the
corporate entity during the late 1960s, state:
The rise of the modem corporation has brought a concentration of
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modem
state-economic power versus political power, each strong in its own
field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation,
while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every
effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned,
it even attempts to dominate the state. The future may see the
economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an
equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the
dominant form of social organization.
21. Id. at 1482.
22. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 313 (rev. ed. 1968). See also Morton S. Baratz, Corporate Giants and the Power
Structure, 9 W. POL. Q. 406, 413 (1956) ("[Plublic policy necessarily tends to be oriented,
especially over the long run, in a direction which is fundamentally in line with the interests of the
great corporate enterprises... even if the interests of the giants are in conflict with other social
goals."). Even those supporting an expansion of corporate rights do not deny the immense power
of the modem business corporation. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman,
What's Good for General Motors: torporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 235, 246 (1998) ("[I]t would be difficult to deny corporate activity's enormous
impact on both the nation's welfare and the government's success.").
23. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 172 (1977) (stating
corporations have "become a kind of public official and exercise what, on a broad view of their
role, are public functions").
24. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 22, at 313. This concern is a recurring theme in modem
corporate law, especially following the corporate social responsibility movement, which occurred
during the 1970s. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76
TuL. L. REv. 1207, 1211-16 (2002) (discussing power of modem business corporations); Daniel
J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REv. 995,
1007 (1998) ("The modern publicly traded multinational corporation... appears to be as large
and well organized, as in control of resources and potential instruments of coercion or power over
individuals as are most local governments."). The contrary view is the law and economics
movement, a variant of the aggregate metaphor, which views corporations as functions of the
market and advocates corporate autonomy and regulatory restraint. Branson, supra at 1217
(footnote omitted). Law and economics largely swallowed the corporate social responsibility
movement during its rise in the 1980s, and it remains a powerful influence in corporate theory
today. Id. However, the 1990s saw the beginning of a new corporate social responsibility
movement, "advocat[ing] a 'communitarian' model of the corporation." Id. This movement
2005]
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The development of corporate power and the rise of the modem
business corporation can be traced by examining the history of
corporate personality doctrine.25 The concept of a corporate entity has
always been difficult for both economists and jurists to define, for the
American legal system embodies "an ancient tradition of seeing the
world as composed of private individuals and government
entities .... It is in this tradition that the Constitution was founded;
the Bill of Rights focuses primarily on relationships between the
government and individuals.27 It is also in this tradition that the
American common law has evolved. A corporation, which is not an
individual "person" by any stretch of the imagination, is nonetheless a
legal actor in American society. Therefore, the law has been forced to
determine how to treat corporations within a legal tradition that is not
particularly well suited for the task.
In order to help the American legal tradition "see" corporations,
corporate theorists have developed various metaphors to analogize the
corporate entity to the individual actor which the law presumes. 8 This
has resulted in a legal "personification" of corporations and the creation
of corporate personality doctrine. In other words, the law's adoption of
metaphors has produced a legal fiction by creating a corporate
person. Corporate personality doctrine includes three major theories
focuses on the role of corporations in the community, promoting corporate responsibility to
"stakeholders." Id. In the broadest conception, "stakeholders" can mean society in general. Id.
The rationale for this movement is well-expressed by Professor Lawrence Mitchell, who wrote:
[N]o institution other than the state so dominates our public discourse and our private
lives .... [C]orporations make most everything we consume. Their advertising and
products fill almost every waking moment of our lives. They give us jobs, and
sometimes a sense of identity. They define communities, and enhance both our
popular and serious culture. They present the investment opportunities that send our
children to college, and provide for our old age. They fund our research.
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at xiii (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995).
25. See infra Part H1 (discussing the various "personalities" corporations have taken
throughout American history). While other legal developments-such as those in contract and
tort law, which developed coextensively with corporate law-also contributed greatly to the rise
of corporate power, they are beyond the scope of this Article and will not be addressed here.
26. Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1013; see also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 85-87 (1986) (discussing how to determine whether organizations are entitled
to legal rights).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
28. See infra Part II (showing how corporate theorists have used a variety of metaphors in
evaluating the rights of a corporation).
29. This legal fiction is most prevalent in constitutional law, where the Court has created
corporate "constitutional persons" through the adoption of corporate metaphors. The Court's use
of these metaphors is discussed at length infra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court's view of
metaphor and the corporate person).
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of how a corporation should be viewed, though each theory has several
variants. These three theories are the artificial entity theory, ° the
aggregate entity theory,3  and the real entity theory.32  Each view
developed in light of the legal struggle to fit corporations into the
American legal tradition.33 The Court has adopted all three theories in
addressing corporate constitutional rights, and all three theories are
present in modem corporate theory.34 However, the theories are vastly
different in their respective foci, which illustrates the inherent problem
with the Court's reliance on them as a basis of constitutional rights.
Because each theory views the corporate entity differently, the Court,
through its adoption of these metaphors, has created a corporate
"person" that is schizophrenic in nature. To understand this point fully,
it is necessary to examine the underpinnings of each theory.
A. Corporations as Artificial Entities
The corporate entity was not a novel concept in America at the time
of the nation's founding, for corporate law was transplanted from
England, where theories of the corporate entity were already being
developed.3" However, the conception and economic reality of the
corporate entity was radically different from that which exists today.
English commentators originally viewed corporations as "artificial
person[s]," created by the state, with only those powers given to them
by the state.36 Corporations at this time existed only for the public
30. See infra Part II.A (discussing the corporation as an artificial entity).
31. See infra Part II.B (discussing the aggregate theory of corporations).
32. See infra Part II.C (discussing the rise of the real entity theory of corporations and charting
the evolution of legal realism).
33. See Mark, supra note 20, at 1445 (discussing the difficulty of fitting corporations into the
American legal system when corporations possess characteristics of both individuals and
governments).
34. See infra Part IIl (reviewing how the Supreme Court has treated corporate metaphors over
time). Though the debate over corporate personality ebbed for much of the twentieth century,
over the last twenty years it has once again become a hot topic among corporate theorists.
Corporate theory is currently in what has been phrased the "neoclassical" period, in which
variants of all three major theories of corporate personality are competing in the academic
literature. See infra Part II.D (discussing the resurgence of the debate over corporate personality).
35. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing early English notions of the
corporate entity).
36. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 475-76 (1st ed.
Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765); 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWES OF ENGLAND 250a (n.p. 1628); 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 69-70, 103 (London, J. Butterworth, Fleet Street) (1793) (discussing corporate
empowerment under the laws of England and the powers, rights and capacities provided under
certain laws); see also Case of Sutton's Hosp., 10 Coke 23a, 30b-32b, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 970-73
(1612) (stating a corporation is "invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and
consideration of the law").
2005]
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good-to accomplish the public purposes for which they were created.
Moreover, because corporations were creatures of the state, they existed
at the pleasure of the state, and the state reserved the power to modify
any of the rights granted to them, or even to remove their charter
entirely.37 Under this view, a corporation was a legal fiction, an
artificial entity.38
The economic and social position of corporations during the early
nineteenth century was also vastly different from today. During the
early nineteenth century, business corporations were few and far
between; "business was generally conducted by single proprietorships
or partnerships rather than corporations. 3 9  This continued to be true
throughout most of the nineteenth century. Corporations did not
overtake partnerships as the most common method of doing business
until nearly the turn of the century. 40 Private business corporations did
not become prevalent until the end of the nineteenth century, and large
institutional corporations were nonexistent until the railroad and bank
conglomerates began to amass power in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. 4 Because corporations were radically different economic and
social actors, they did not invoke the "revolutionary republican fear of
concentrated power and skepticism about the utility of large
institutions" that many citizens held after the Revolutionary War. As a
37. See Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional
Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1456 (1992) (discussing how corporations' entitlement to constitutional
rights were constrained by the state, which chose whether to grant a charter or not).
38. See Blumberg, supra note 19, at 292. While the artificial entity metaphor was the
predominant theory at the time of our nation's founding, it was not the only metaphor used. The
aggregate entity theory, which basically views a corporation as the product of its collective parts,
was also present. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1989). Thus, early commentators
stated that "the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties
of the persons who compose it...." VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE § 1, at 2 (1882). While the artificial entity
view dominated for most of the nineteenth century, the aggregate metaphor can also be seen in
some of the Court's early cases. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
the aggregate entity metaphor in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61
(1809)); see also GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54-57 (1918) (commenting on Deveaux).
39. Mark, supra note 20, at 1444.
40. See id. (indicating that the change in the role of the corporation at the end of the nineteenth
century was due, in part, to state support for economic development).
41. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1634-35 (1988) (indicating that during this time period the incorporation process was
"democratized" and the enactment of state general incorporation acts allowed businesses to
incorporate on their own, that is, without state interaction).
42. Mark, supra note 20, at 1443.
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result, "[v]ery little tension arose between economic practice and
individualist economic and legal theory in the early nineteenth
century. 43
The seminal Supreme Court case adopting the artificial entity theory
is Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.44 In that case, the Court
considered whether a state could unilaterally modify a corporate charter
that it had previously granted. 45 The case is noteworthy for two main
reasons. First, it firmly established the artificial entity metaphor in
constitutional jurisprudence. 4 The Court described the corporate entity
as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being a mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. 4 7  Second, the Court
began to branch away from British corporate law by striking down the
State's ability to amend a corporation's charter unilaterally. Relying on
the Contract Clause, the Court held that a corporate charter was a
contract between a corporation and the state, and the state therefore
lacked the power to amend a previously granted corporate charter in the
48
absence of express authority to do so contained within the charter.
The impact of the Dartmouth College decision on the development of
corporate law was substantial. First, the Court's explicit adoption of the
artificial entity metaphor set the stage for the Court's subsequent use of
metaphors in cases dealing with corporate constitutional rights.49 The
artificial entity metaphor remained the predominant view of the
corporate entity through most of the nineteenth century. Second, the
Court's holding, with its emphasis on protecting corporate property
rights, proved equally powerful. While the Court defined a corporation
as an "artificial being" created by the state, it held that corporate
property could not be disposed of at the state's whim once it had been
43. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1483.
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
45. Id. at 637-38.
46. Although the Court did not consider whether a corporation was a "person" under the
Constitution, the Court's use of the artificial entity metaphor is important to demonstrate the
development of corporate personality theory, particularly in light of the frequent citation of Chief
Justice Marshall's view of the corporate entity.
47. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636.
48. Id. at 638. State legislatures reacted to the Dartmouth College decision by including
clauses in corporate charters which expressly reserved to the state the ability to amend or repeal a
corporation's charter. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 197-98 (2d
ed. 1985). This circumvented the effect of the Dartmouth College holding and was in part the
impetus for the passage of the general incorporation acts during the Jackson administration,
discussed infra Part II.B.2.
49. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636.
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created.5° This limit on the state's authority provided a basis for an
expansion in corporate autonomy and power, especially as corporations
began to see greater use as regular vehicles for doing business at the end
of the nineteenth century.51
This departure from English corporate law did not go unnoticed.
Many commentators disagreed with the Court's use of the Contract
Clause to shield corporations from state interference. For example,
Thomas Cooley noted:
It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College
case that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country
have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations actually
having greater influence in the country and upon the legislation of the
country than the states to which they owed their corporate existence.
Every privilege granted or right conferred-no matter by what means
or on what pretense-being made inviolable by the Constitution, the
government is frequently found stripped of its authority in very
52important particulars, by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation.
Another commentator argued that the Dartmouth College rule should
not have been applied to business corporations, and that the English rule
should have been retained for these entities.53 Yet another stated, "[t]o
recognize in a legislature the power by a contract to tie the hands of all
future legislatures, and deprive them of the power to interpose
regulations that may become needful as a protection to the public
against the aggressions.., of the corporation[s], would be a specimen
of political suicide.5 4 These excerpts demonstrate that commentators
as early as the nineteenth century saw the corporate entity's potential to
50. Id.
51. See infra Part H.C (discussing the radical change in corporate theory at the turn of the
century as corporations came to be seen as market and societal actors).
52. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 335 (2d ed. Boston,
Little Brown & Co. 1871). According to Cooley, the result of Dartmouth College was that the
Contract Clause, "whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts," had been interpreted
in such a manner as to perpetuate entrenched corporate authority. Id. at 167.
53. FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW 556-57 (1884) (noting the English rule,
"that business franchises granted by the legislature can, in all cases, be recalled and modified
when the public interests require, provided that in this way private property is not taken without
adequate compensation," was preferable).
54. 2 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF
PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 959 (1900). Tiedeman felt that the state should
retain authority and flexibility to control corporations, and believed that the emerging classical
conception of the corporation, brought about by Dartmouth College, had resulted in a narrowing
of the Contract Clause's application to corporations and an increase in substantive due process
rights. See id. (discussing the danger of narrowing the application of the contract clause).
[Vol. 37
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amass enough power and influence to merit treatment as a quasi-
governmental institution.55
In summary, the artificial entity metaphor, as set forth in Dartmouth
College, defines a corporation as an artificial being, intangible in nature
and existing by virtue of the state's authority.56  This theory was
prevalent in British corporate law and was transplanted to America
following the Revolutionary War.57 The Court's adoption of the
artificial entity metaphor in Dartmouth College provides an early
example of the Court's use of corporate theory to adjudicate a
corporation's constitutional rights.5  The case also demonstrates,
however, a break from the British tradition, which signaled a
developing trend in favor of corporate autonomy.5 9 The artificial entity
metaphor remained the dominant view of the corporate entity through
much of the nineteenth century, and it remains prevalent in corporate
theory as well as constitutional law today. 60  As the nineteenth century
progressed, the corporate entity continued to emerge as a dominant
social and economic institution, having gained its toehold in Dartmouth
College.
B. General Incorporation and Aggregate Entities
In addition to the artificial entity theory, the aggregate view of the
corporate entity was also prevalent in corporate theory during the
55. These commentators' general abhorrence of the powers being granted to corporations is
instructive in considering the position of the modem business corporation. The corporate entity
has generally gained more institutional power, and become less the subject of regulatory controls,
since the early twentieth century. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing quasi-
governmental view of corporations). However, the Court did not view the corporate entity in this
manner at the time Dartmouth College was decided. As Mark notes, "[t]hat a second set of
public institutions could operate within the sovereignty of the state and federal governments was
simply dismissed as beyond the bounds of acceptable thought." Mark, supra note 20, at 1447.
56. Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
57. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing early English notions of the
corporate entity).
58. See supra notes 53-57, infra notes 59-61, and accompanying text (discussing the holding
of Dartmouth College and the way in which the Court used the artificial entity metaphor to reach
that holding).
59. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636.
60. See infra notes 74, 77, 80 and accompanying text (listing several nineteenth-century cases
in which the court relied on the artificial entity metaphor). The artificial entity theory of the
corporation can still be seen in modem constitutional law. For example, in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, a First Amendment case in which corporations challenged a Massachusetts
statute that limited corporate spending for political speech, Justice Rehnquist stated, "I would
think that any particular form of organization upon which the State confers special privileges or
immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether
the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation." 435 U.S.
765, 826-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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nineteenth century. This theory, which emerged early in corporate
jurisprudence and became a dominant metaphor following Andrew
Jackson's presidency, views a corporation as "an association of
individuals contracting with each other in organizing the corporation.'
The aggregate entity metaphor was a product of both Jacksonian era
classicism-which strove to make the corporate entity available to all
Americans through the general incorporation acts-and the corporate
bar's push to equate corporations with partnerships during the latter half
62of the nineteenth century. While the aggregate entity metaphor was
first used by the Court during the Marshall era, it became a dominant
metaphor during the latter half of the nineteenth century and was
particularly instrumental in the Court's first cases dealing with
corporate constitutional rights. The aggregate entity theory remains a
dominant metaphor in modern corporate theory, 6 3 and it is present in the
Court's modern cases as well.64
The aggregate entity theory has its roots in American associational
activity. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the early
nineteenth century, the corporate entity had not yet become a prominent
65
economic actor in American society. Yet, de Tocqueville noted "that
the right and ability of individuals to form voluntary associations
constituted an integral part of the fabric of American society ....,,66
This included associating to form "commercial and manufacturing
companies," which at that time meant small, unincorporated enterprises,
67as well as political activity groups. Thus, while American citizens
were generally distrustful of concentrated institutional power (a remnant
of America's relationship with Britain), associational activity was seen
as "necessary to enhance the powers of individually powerless citizens
61. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 293.
62. See Rivard, supra note 37, at 1458 (explaining that the "partnership analogy" is one school
of thought pertaining to the aggregate entity theory); see generally Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at
1634-35 (noting the development of corporate theory during the Jacksonian era).
63. The theory has been revised by current law and economics scholars, who characterize the
corporate entity as "a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships
among individual factors of production." Bratton, supra note 38, at 1471. See generally Melvin
Aaron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 582, 582 (1984) (discussing contractual approach).
64. See infra notes 104, 108 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court's adoption
of the aggregate entity theory and later confirmation of the theory).
65. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing how corporations of the time were
created by the state to serve the public).
66. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 22, at 252.
67. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128, 140-41 (Henry Reeve trans.,
London, Longman, Green, Longman, & Roberts 1862).
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by allowing them to unite in order to amass power., 68  It is from this
line of reasoning that the aggregate theory of the corporate entity drew
its strength.
1. Development in the Marshall Era
The aggregate entity metaphor of the corporation was first adopted by
the Supreme Court during the Marshall era.69  However, the
associational view during that era was much more restrained than what
is seen today.70 For example, in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,7'
the Court held that a corporation was not a "citizen" under the
Constitution. 72  "As a result, diversity of citizenship for federal
jurisdictional purposes was the citizenship of the corporation's
shareholders rather than the state of incorporation or the corporation's
principal place of business.,,7' As a result, corporations were allowed
easy access to federal courts because it was easy to demonstrate
diversity of citizenship. This aggregate view of corporate citizenship
persisted until the Court's decision in Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson.7  Letson reversed the rationale,
adopting the artificial entity theory of the corporation to hold that a
corporation would be deemed a "citizen" of the state of incorporation
68. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 22, at 252 (footnote omitted). According to Redish and
Wasserman:
Absent the special economic and legal advantages of the corporate form, individual
entrepreneurs who lacked personal fortunes were unable to compete effectively with
those who possessed such wealth. Thus, the corporation's growth represented "the
economic aspect of the policital [sic] and social forces that democratized the United
States during the Age of Jackson.
Id. at 253 (citing RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION
1784-1855 at 256 (1982)) ([sic] in original). Ironically, it was in part this social focus on
associational activity that prompted the general incorporation statutes, which were the first major
step toward the modem business corporation. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the emergence of
general incorporation statutes during the Jacksonian era).
69. Notably, this was the same Court that adopted the artificial entity metaphor in Dartmouth
College, reflecting the Court's difficulty in determining the proper way to define the corporate
entity.
70. See infra Part l1.D (discussing the modem associational view, which views corporations as
a nexus of relationships among various units of production).
71. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
72. Id. at 86.
73. Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1598. While this view departs from the artificial entity
theory, "Chief Justice Marshall made it plain that the associational view was superimposed upon,
rather than replacing, entity law." Blumberg, supra note 19, at 303. According to Blumberg,
"[s]hareholder interests entered only to support the assertion of federal jurisdiction over corporate
litigation ... ." Id.
74. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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for purposes of jurisdiction." However, the Court retained the previous
result: a "corporation received the jurisdictional opportunities open to
citizens without the Court having to accord 'citizenship' to it."'7 6 Ten
years later, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,7 7 the Taney
Court reclarified that a corporation was not a constitutional citizen, yet
adopted a legal presumption that a corporation's shareholders were
citizens of the state of incorporation.78 While the result is a complete
legal fiction, it is still the governing law, though now under statute.79
The aggregate entity theory also appears in Chief Justice Marshall's
dissent in United States v. Dandridge.° In that case, Marshall argued
that a corporation could only sue on a bond if it spoke in "the aggregate
voice. . . . These individuals must speak collectively to speak
corporately, and must use a collective voice. '"' In this context, the
aggregate entity view was widely rejected by the turn of the century as
"[c]ourts began holding that shareholders ordinarily lacked standing to
sue for injuries to the corporation.2 The ultimate effect of these
decisions was to separate the ownership of the corporate entity-the
shareholders-from the control of the corporate entity-now effectively
held by the corporate entity itself, usually exercised through the board
of directors.83 Thus, the property rights held by a corporation were
effectively being separated from one another. 84
2. Emergence During the Jacksonian Era
While the aggregate view of the corporation first appeared in the
decisions of the Marshall Court, it became especially prominent during
the period following Andrew Jackson's presidency. Influenced heavily
by Adam Smith, the "founder of classical political economy,"85
75. Id. at 558-59.
76. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 304.
77. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
78. Id. at 328-29. Again, the result remained the same, though the rationale reversed.
79. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 149 (4th ed. 1983) (stating, in
note 6, that except as modified by a 1958 statute, the doctrine is settled).
80. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827).
81. Id. at 92.
82. Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1600. This trend is illustrative of the inherent dichotomy in
corporate theory; even as the aggregate metaphor was becoming the dominant theory through the
end of the nineteenth century, it was being rejected by courts in this context.
83. See id. (stating that "[s]hareholder disqualification from direct participation in the classical
corporation's legal affairs began the gradual separation of corporate ownership from its control").
84. The separation of ownership from control is one of the key features of the modem
business corporation, and has been the subject of much discussion in corporate theory. This
subject is given further attention infra, Part Il.C.
85. Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1610.
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Jacksonian era corporate theorists advocated a pro-industrial economy,
believing that the market was self-regulating in terms of price-setting.86
"Although Adam Smith distinguished between 'natural' and 'market'
prices ... by the time of John Stuart Mill, a 'just' price, if it existed,
was nothing other than the price set by the market., 87 Recognizing the
capability of the corporate entity as a market participant (especially as
the country became increasingly industrial), Jacksonian era corporate
theorists began advocating the availability of the corporate entity to
every citizen as a means of conducting business.
The great innovation of Jacksonian era corporate theorists was to
make the general business corporation available to all Americans.
Under Jackson's administration, states promulgated general
incorporation acts, which allowed individuals to incorporate their
businesses without first seeking a special charter from the state
legislature.88 The general incorporation acts altered the legal conception
of the corporate entity by undermining a central premise of both the
Dartmouth College case and the artificial entity theory-that
corporations were created by the state and existed only for the purposes
contained in the charter granted by the state.8 9 Free incorporation made
the corporate entity "available by a simple procedure on equal terms to
all who saw use for them in ordinary business associations." 90 "IT]he
process of chartering ceased to be a legislative matter and became an
administrative and procedural one." 91  The immediate effect of the
general incorporation acts was to "move[] the predominant role in
corporate organization from the state to the incorporators and
shareholders." 92 Due to the general incorporation statutes, the corporate
entity came to be seen "as merely one form of voluntary association, an
aggregation of talent and resources, consciously entered into by
86. Id. at 1627.
87. Id. (citing ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, MORAL REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE: THE
DEMISE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH POLITICAL ECONOMY 155-67,
220 (1979)).
88. See Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1634 (discussing business corporations acts during the
Jacksonian period).
89. The first large corporations to surface after the general incorporation acts were railroads
and banks. These types of corporations were supervised by the States quite strictly because of
their quasi-public nature. Mark, supra note 20, at 1444. Late in the nineteenth century, however,
the use of corporations as a method of doing business exploded as individual citizens began
taking advantage of the ready availability of the corporate entity. Id. at 1445.
90. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1970).
91. Mark, supra note 20, at 1454. In effect, citizens were able to incorporate their business
ventures by simply filling out the necessary paperwork.
92. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 293.
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individuals."93 This made it difficult to ignore the individuals behind
the corporate fiction. This concept of the corporate entity as a vessel for
individual self-realization, coupled with the corporate bar's strong push
for enhanced corporate rights, led to the adoption of the aggregate entity
metaphor in corporate and constitutional jurisprudence.
3. The Artificial Entity and the Partnership Analogy
Corporate theory reached a crossroads at the end of the nineteenth
century. The aggregate entity theory became more prevalent as
individual citizens began taking advantage of the general incorporation
statutes to form business corporations. 94 Yet, the artificial entity theory
was still relied on by advocates of regulation, who used "conceptions of
businesses 'affected with the public interest' to carve out a way to deal
effectively with corporate power., 95  In response, the corporate bar
began advocating an expansion in corporate rights by suggesting that
corporations were similar to partnerships.96  The goal was not to
increase the liability of corporate actors, but to increase the freedom of
corporations to act without state restraints. Advocates combined the
Dartmouth College proposition that corporate private property was
protected from state interference with the appealing concept of
individual rights that had emerged during the Jacksonian era.97 The
result was the idea that "the rights and duties of an incorporated
93. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 22, at 254.
94. Around the turn of the century, the corporate entity replaced the partnership as the primary
means by which American citizens did business. Many of the corporations formed during this
period were not the large conglomerates that are present today, but were "close" corporations,
usually small businesses. This made the individuals behind the corporations more difficult to
ignore. It is noteworthy that the large corporate institutions which existed at the time, such as
railroads and banks-the closest nineteenth century analogy to the modern business
corporation-were viewed as quasi-public bodies, and were treated by the law as such. See, e.g.,
Mark, supra note 20, at 1444 (discussing railroad and bank conglomerates in the late nineteenth
century).
95. Id. at 1457. Such statements were generally made in relation to the large railroad
corporations and banks, which undeniably served public purposes. The American public was
especially skeptical of these types of corporations, particularly as monopolization became a major
legal concern and the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §
2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005))
(regulating monopolies). However, these are much the same arguments that are being made by
social responsibility theorists today: that modern business corporations exercise a great deal of
power and influence over society, and should therefore be treated as quasi-public actors. This
view is discussed in further depth infra Part I.D.
96. Mark, supra note 20, at 1457.
97. This idea also derived from the aggregate theories utilized by the Marshall Court, but was
premised on notions of individual freedom as well. By persuading courts to look past the
corporation to see the individual actors, as in a partnership, advocates attempted to demonstrate
that corporations should have the same rights as a natural person.
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association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who
compose it, and not of an imaginary being." 98 Thus, advocates argued
that corporations should "operate with the flexibility of a partnership
and the property protection of an individual, while remaining under the
control of a relatively limited body of managers. ' 99
Though the Court never fully adopted the partnership analogy, its
reasoning was significant in persuading the Court to buy into the
aggregate entity metaphor, particularly in decisions affecting corporate
constitutional rights. In the Railroad Tax Cases,'0° Justice Field, then
sitting on the circuit court, held for the majority that corporations could
claim equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The court stated that "[t]o deprive the corporation of its property, or to
burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or to
lessen its value.' 0 2  Thus, the court imputed the corporation's
constitutional personhood from that of the individuals who had formed
the corporation. In a concurring opinion, Justice Sawyer went even
further, stating "[t]he truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of
protecting rights, the property of all business and trading corporations is
the property of the individual corporators.' ' 3
Four years after the Railroad Tax Cases, the aggregate entity
metaphor of the corporation was adopted by the Supreme Court in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., a case that has proven
to be a watershed moment for corporate constitutional rights.' °4 In that
case, the Court held for the first time that a corporation is a "person"
under the equal protection clause.'0 5 The Court's holding contained no
reasoning or analysis, but merely stated:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to those corporations. We are all of the
opinion that it does.1
0 6
98. MORAWETZ, supra note 38, § 1, at 2.
99. Mark, supra note 20, at 1459.
100. 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as moot, San Mateo County v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
101. Id. at 744.
102. Id. at 747.
103. Id. at 758.
104. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 396.
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While the opinion contains no constitutional interpretation or analysis
of corporations' constitutional personhood, the presence of Justice
Field, "the likeliest source[] for a new vision of the corporation,"
suggests that the Court likely based its decision on the aggregate entity
theory present in the Railroad Tax Cases.'0 7 The Court confirmed this
implication two years later in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining &
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,0 8 where it stated, "[c]orporations are
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose.... The
equal protection of the laws which these bodies may claim is only such
as is accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the
State.""
Santa Clara may be viewed as the watershed case for corporate
constitutional rights, for by holding that a corporation is a constitutional
"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, it provided the foundation
for all corporate constitutional rights. However, the underpinnings of
the decision demonstrate that the Court's analysis of the corporate
"person" was faulty. The Court likely relied on the partnership analogy
and the aggregate entity metaphor to look past the corporate shell to see
the individual property rights." ° In this sense, the Court likened the
corporate entity to the natural "person" described in the Fourteenth
Amendment by focusing on the rights of the natural persons who had
founded the corporation."' However, the Santa Clara decision also
implicates the artificial entity metaphor, for the effect was to allow a
corporation, rather than its shareholders, to remain the named party in
all corporate litigation." 2 Thus, a corporation was an artificial entity,
107. Mark, supra note 20, at 1463.
108. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
109. Id. at 189.
110. Roscoe Conkling, who argued the Railroad Tax Cases before the Supreme Court,
advocated corporate personhood "to protect property, individual property held in corporate form,
but not corporate autonomy per se." Mark, supra note 20, at 1462-63. Conkling was heavily
influenced by John Norton Pomeroy, who also advocated individual property rights held in the
aggregate. Pomeroy's aggregate entity theory was in part adopted by Justice Field in the
Railroad Tax Cases, who wrote: "[T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the
corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect them, though the process be in its name."
The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 748 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as moot, San
Mateo County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
111. See Pembina, 125 U.S. at 189 (explaining that corporations are merely associations of
individuals united for a special purpose-to do business).
112. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1643 (arguing that Santa Clara was decided
based on convenience of naming corporation, rather than shareholders, in corporation's
litigation). Hovenkamp argues that in Santa Clara, "the Court selected the shortest and most
practical route to its end." Id. at 1645. Under the Santa Clara rule, corporate litigation would be
approved by the board of directors, and carried on in a corporation's name, without the consent of
the corporation's shareholder's. Santa Clara thus demonstrates the separation of ownership (the
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recognized as a fictional legal "person" for purposes of litigation. In
this sense, the Santa Clara Court used the aggregate entity metaphor to
justify protecting corporate rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the artificial entity metaphor to justify constitutional litigation in a
corporation's name. Thus, the legal "person" recognized by the Court
was a complete legal fiction.
The inherent problem with the use of both metaphors in Santa Clara
is that the Court granted constitutional personhood to corporations
without inquiring whether corporations should be entitled to it as a
matter of law. Corporate theorists at the time could not even agree as to
whether the artificial entity metaphor or the aggregate entity metaphor
properly defined the corporate entity. Yet, the Court drew on both
metaphors within the same case to recognize the constitutional rights of
corporations for the first time. Moreover, the Court's use of both
metaphors to justify the result-that shareholders did not have authority
to bring suit on a corporation's behalf-is indicative of the Court's
generally ad hoc approach to corporate constitutional rights." 3  This
injects a great deal of uncertainty into the constitutional validity of the
decision, especially given the subsequent use of the Santa Clara holding
as a basis for the expansion of corporate constitutional rights."
14
In summary, the aggregate entity theory was the result of two
important historical developments. First, the Jacksonian era saw the
general incorporation acts replace the state as the fountainhead of
shareholders)-from control (the board of directors). In essence, the shareholders were removed
from the equation.
113. In the line of cases involving corporate constitutional rights, discussed infra Part III, the
Court defines the corporate entity differently at each turn, seemingly adopting whatever metaphor
favors the desired result.
114. The basis of the aggregate entity theory, used to extend constitutional "personhood" to
corporations in Santa Clara, differs dramatically from the reality of the modem business
corporation. Individuals today do not incorporate "to self-realize.., and personally benefit[]
from the political-economic system through the power of collective action." Redish &
Wasserman, supra note 22, at 254. Rather, individuals simply buy shares in corporations to
receive profits. Modem corporate law views shareholders as only "moments in the market, legal
abstractions that have interests quite different from ... real citizens." Greenwood, supra note 24,
at 1003. As a result, "[b]oth the law and the market force the corporate actors to run the
corporation on behalf of the interests of fictional shareholders." Id. at 1004. Generally, this
means that the fictional shareholder is interested only in profits, and the managers' main duty is
to profit-maximize. Also, the idea implicit in the aggregate entity theory-that individuals
collectively hold property and rights under the corporate entity-is simply not present in modem
corporate law. Shareholders in modem business corporations "have no right to withdraw money
from the corporate treasury, and have no right to control its use." Id. at 1009 n.39. Shareholders
in modem business corporations have few of the common law rights of property ownership, a
point dramatically made by commentators since the early 1900s. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 22, at 244-46 (discussing separation of ownership from control).
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corporate existence with the American citizen.11 This "played [a] major
role[] in making the corporation appear to be a natural way to organize
property.""' 6 The corporate entity became increasingly conceptualized
as consistent with individual autonomy as individual citizens began
using the corporate entity as a general means of doing business.
Second, the corporate bar began advocating for recognition of
individual rights held in collective form."7 These two complementary
lines of reasoning dovetailed in the emergence of the aggregate entity
metaphor during the late nineteenth century, culminating with the
Supreme Court's use of the metaphor to establish a corporate
constitutional "person" in Santa Clara.
C. Real Entities, Market Regulation, and Managerialism
The "real entity" metaphor of the corporation first appeared around
the turn of the twentieth century. The real entity theory generally views
the corporate entity as a natural creature, to be recognized apart from its
owners, existing autonomously from the state." 8  To elaborate, a
corporation is "an organic social reality with an existence independent
of, and constituting something more than, its changing shareholders."
' 9
The real entity theory emerged from several strains of corporate theory
as the debate over corporate personification was "brought... to the
forefront of juridical controversies" in the early 1900s.120  First, the
partnership analogy, which had resulted in partial judicial acceptance of
the aggregate metaphor, proved to be counter to the realities of
twentieth-century business corporations. 121  Second, corporations
became management-dominated. 22 Finally, legal realism became the
dominant strain of corporate theory, pushing the real entity theory to the
forefront of the academic discussion. 123  The legal realism movement
115. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the aggregate entity view during the Jacksonian era).
116. Mark, supra note 20, at 1455.
117. See supra notes 98-99 (discussing rights of a corporation as actual rights of individuals
who make up the corporation).
118. See Rivard, supra note 37, at 1459-61 (explaining the real entity theory).
119. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 295. This is particularly important given the fictional view
of a modem shareholder, which assumes that shareholders are moments in the market, the product
of a decision to buy or sell at any moment. Thus, the modem business corporation continues to
exist even as its owners change on a daily basis through market trading.
120. Mark, supra note 20, at 1467.
121. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the decline of the partnership analogy and the emergence
of the real entity metaphor).
122. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the growth of managerial corporations). This
development was coextensive with the separation of ownership and control in large business
corporations.
123. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the growth of legal realism and the emergence of the real
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was so successful in establishing the corporate entity as a normal
business model that by the 1930s the debate over corporate personality
essentially disappeared. That a corporation was a legal actor, endowed
with protectable interests, became accepted doctrine.
1 4
1. The Decline of the Partnership Analogy
The partnership analogy advocated by the corporate bar in the late
nineteenth century, while successful in gaining acceptance of the
aggregate entity metaphor, also suffered several shortcomings. First, it
did not recognize "that part of the value of corporate property was that
corporations were ongoing operations premised on the ability to
maintain property as a unit."'125 Second, shareholders, who were
originally viewed as the owners of a corporation, did not have the
common law rights of ownership. 26  Finally, an organicist view of
society, which "saw society as a collection of collectivities, each a
legitimate outgrowth of individuals," arose in corporate theory. 27
Under this view, corporations were natural entities, which were equally
capable of participating in society as an individual person. The
organicist theory thus bridged the gap between the aggregate metaphor
and the search for corporate autonomy by making the corporate entity
seem to be a natural way of conducting business. It was from this strain
that the real entity metaphor grew.
2. The Growth of Managerial Corporations
The second key development in corporate law during this period,
which complemented the organicist view, was the rapid growth of
managerial corporations. The growth of managerialism has been
explained in several different ways. According to Alfred Chandler, the
corporate entity became a dominant economic and social actor by
lowering costs; by internalizing production units it was able to cut
transaction costs. 128  Such internalization required coordination and
oversight, and management was the solution. 129  In essence,
entity as the dominant theory).
124. Mark, supra note 20, at 1481.
125. Id. at 1464. See also supra note 112 (discussing separation of ownership from control in
modem business corporations).
126. Rivard, supra note 37, at 1460. This phenomenon was intertwined with the rise of the
managerial-centered model of the corporation, which became prevalent during the same period.
Both features combined to take away the rhetorical bite of the aggregate metaphor.
127. Mark, supra note 20, at 1469.
128. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 6-8 (1977).
129. Id.
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managerialism simply won out in a Darwinian marketplace. Other
commentators believe that managerialism became prominent because
industry became increasingly specialized.130 The resources had higher
fixed costs, and the market was inefficient at determining prices.'
Thus, management was needed to coordinate productive efforts in such
an economy.' Whatever the reasons, the American economy grew
rapidly at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the management
corporation quickly became a prevalent economic actor.3 3  The
twentieth-century corporation was technically owned by shareholders
but run by management; the separation of ownership from control was a
reality.
3. The Growth of Legal Realism
The initial impact of the separation of corporate ownership from
control was to undercut part of the justification for the aggregate entity
theory. If corporate autonomy was initially premised on the notion that
a corporation is a collective body of individual property rights-under
the aggregate entity theory-what happened to that autonomy if
shareholders did not have the ability to control their property? As
management corporations became dominant, it became clear that the
corporate entity itself, rather than individual shareholders, "guided the
flow of goods through the processes of production and distribution.' 34
Thus, "[t]he reality of the corporation apart from its members was
becoming clearer as the relationship of the shareholders to the
operations of the business became increasingly distant."'135  Because
"[t]he 'life' of the corporation could no longer be identified with that of
the corporators ... [the corporation's actions] had to be recognized as
autonomous, the product of its organization and management."'
136
However, one central problem remained. American common law was
premised on adjudicating the individual rights of natural persons; "[t]he
irreducible unit of the common law was the individual person.' 3 7 Thus,
the legal system still faced the task of determining how to recognize a
130. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 49-51 (1984) (establishing that modem corporations and their
structures arose in response).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 8 (discussing administrative coordination as a central
function of the modem business enterprise).
134. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1488.
135. Mark, supra note 20, at 1472.
136. Id. at 1473.
137. Id. at 1472.
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corporate legal actor. The legal realist movement developed in response
to this problem.
The personification of the corporate entity continued to be an
important subject of debate in corporate theory in the early twentieth
century, even as managerialist corporations came to dominate the
economy. While the artificial entity metaphor was no longer prevalent,
a split formed in corporate theory. On one side, individualists
advocated a contractual theory, which built on and refined the aggregate
entity theory. 138  This approach continued the tradition of classical
political economy in the Jacksonian vein, focusing on individuals
combining for purposes of production. 139 The second approach was
legal realism, which followed the organicist movement by focusing on
the reality of the corporate actor. 40 To legal realists, "the management
corporation reconstituted the classical profit maximizer in collective
form., ,1 4  This theory effectively turned the corporate entity into the
individual actor the law sought to recognize. The result was an
increasing acceptance of the corporate actor in legal doctrine.
"[C]lassical notions no longer influenced the formation of corporate
law; the emphasis in the discourse shifted to legitimization of the
producing group." 
142
By the 1920s, the real entity view had transformed the state of
corporate law. "The psychological assimilation of the corporation to the
individual contained the connotative powers of personification ... [and]
provided a justification for management's assumption of control of
corporate affairs."'' 43  The image of a corporation as a real entity
persisted for most of the twentieth century, but corporate law turned its
focus to management. Adolf Berle and Gardner Means drove this point
home in their landmark treatise by stressing that with ownership and
control completely separated in the modern business corporation,
management exercised enormous power at the top of a dependent
structure.' 44 The predominant issue in corporate law became managerial
138. See 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH JR., THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1-4 (1891)
(explaining the contractual capacity with which this aggregate "individual" was empowered).
The contractual approach returned to prominence with the law and economics in the early 1980s;
this period is discussed infra Part II.D.
139. Id.
140. See ERNEST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 12-14, 48-50, 55-56,
77-83 (1884) (discussing organic theory, theoretical difficulties, corporate capacity, and the real
nature of corporations).
141. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1490.
142. Id.
143. Mark, supra note 20, at 1477.
144. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 22, at 244-46. Berle and Means noted that the
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legitimacy. Thus, in the 1930s, the federal government implemented
the federal securities laws, which were centered on policing managerial
discretion. Over the next fifty years, corporate theorists focused
primarily on management rather than on corporate personality. 145  The
market became the ultimate regulator of corporations, with the law as a
backdrop to prevent the most egregious forms of self-interested
conduct. Thus, the legal personality of the corporate entity ceased being
the subject of debate in corporate theory until the 1970s.146
Though the debate over corporate personification had ebbed, the
various corporate metaphors continued to be used by the Court,
particularly in its cases concerning corporate constitutional rights.1
47
The real entity theory in particular played a major role in recent
constitutional developments, in which the Court has extended
constitutional protection to corporations under numerous provisions.'48
The expansion of corporate constitutional rights has been so extensive
that modern "corporations have, with isolated exceptions, the same
constitutional status as natural persons.' ' 49 The importance of the real
entity theory in the development of corporate constitutional rights
should not be overemphasized, for each of the major theories of
corporate personality play a role in the Court's decisions even today.5 °
However, the real entity theory has been applied by the Court numerous
management corporation had become "the dominant institution of the modem world." Id. at 313.
145. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1493; see also Blumberg, supra note 19, at 296 (citation
omitted) (noting that the legal realism movement "led to increasing recognition that, whatever its
philosophical nature, the corporation was a 'means to achieve an economic purpose."').
According to Blumberg, "the fundamental issue was not one of theoretical concept but the
adaptation of the law to achieve an appropriate degree of control over the activities of the
corporation in the light of the political values of the times." Blumberg, supra note 19, at 296.
146. Mark, supra note 20 at 1483.
147. See infra Part III (discussing cases illustrating the Court's corporate constitutional
jurisprudence).
148. See infra Part III.B (discussing cases following Santa Clara that extended individual
rights to corporations).
149. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 297.
150. For example, the artificial entity theory can still be seen in modem decisions such as
Bellotti. In that case, Justice Rehnquist characterized the corporate entity as a "particular form of
organization upon which the State confers special privileges." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 826-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The aggregate characterization is also
prevalent, particularly in First Amendment cases involving rights of association and speech. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (stating "association for litigation may be the
most effective form of political association"); Fed. Election Comm. v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986) (holding nonprofit organizations have more extensive rights to
engage in political speech than individual actors). In modem cases, the Court continues to
describe the corporate "person" using different corporate metaphors, and often contradicts itself
by using multiple metaphors within the same case. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying
text (describing the lack of analysis in cases involving corporate constitutional personhood).
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times in recent years to extend various constitutional rights to
corporations. For example, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 5 ' the Court relied on the real entity theory to extend Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy protection to corporations.12 The Court's
description of the corporate entity as a natural person is particularly
striking in this case, where the Court stated:
The Clause, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted
to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
53
Likewise, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 54 the Court relied
on the real entity theory to extend the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure to corporations.'55 The Court
has also adopted the real entity theory of the corporation in certain cases
addressing the free speech rights of corporations.'56
In summary, the real entity theory became the most prominent
definition of the corporate "person" in the early twentieth century. The
real entity theory's emergence was the result of several interrelated
factors. First, the partnership analogy, which had bolstered the
aggregate entity metaphor, became inadequate as corporations
developed into perpetual economic and social actors. 57  Second,
corporations became management-dominated as the separation of
corporate ownership from control became complete. 5 8  Finally, legal
realism, drawing on the organicist movement, became the dominant
strain of corporate theory. 59 These factors legitimized the corporate
entity as an economic actor, thereby motivating the legal system to
151. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
152. Id. at 568-69.
153. Id. at 569 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
154. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
155. Id. at 236. There, the Court stated, "Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is equally clear
that expectation is one society is prepared to observe." Id.
156. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (using real
entity theory to justify free speech rights for corporations); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,,
435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) (stating that corporations do not lose free speech rights because they
are corporations).
157. See supra Part H.C.1 (discussing the shortcomings and decline of the partnership
analogy).
158. See supra Part II.C.2 (commenting on the growth of management dominated
corporations).
159. See supra Part fl.C.3 (discussing the growth of legal realism and its effect on the real
entity theory).
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recognize the corporate entity as a legal actor as well. Acceptance of
the real entity theory was so widespread that the debate over corporate
personality disappeared for nearly fifty years. 60 In recent years the
debate over corporate personality has been renewed by corporate
theorists. It is to this debate that this Article now turns.
D. The Reemergence of Corporate Personality: Neoclassicism
Following the fervent academic debate over corporate personality in
the early 1900s, the real entity theory dominated corporate theory for
several decades. Because of the real entity theory's success in
establishing the corporate entity as a recognized legal actor, corporate
theorists ceased debating the proper personification of the corporate
entity for nearly fifty years.1 6' This stasis abruptly ended during the
1970s, as a resurgence in the debate focused on corporations' positions
in the economy and in society as a whole.
The reemergence of the debate over corporate personality stems from
the development of the corporate social responsibility movement during
the 1970s. Social responsibility theorists began arguing that
corporations lacked sufficient accountability, focusing on the separation
of ownership and control in modern business corporations. 62
Supporters of these theories argued that "large corporations were no
longer merely aggregations of private property... [but] had grown so
large, and their behavior affected so many in society, that the law
should regard them as public, or quasi-public, institutions and regulate
them as such."'163 Social responsibility theorists believed that many ills
of society were the result of corporate behavior-caused by the
separation of ownership and control, which resulted in conflicting
interests for corporate managers.' 64  Accordingly, more extensive
regulations were needed.
Corporate social responsibility theorists advanced several proposals
to combat the perceived evil of the modern business corporation.
Particularly intrusive was a proposal "to legislate federal chartering of
large publicly-held corporations.' 65 Professor William Cary promoted
160. See Mark, supra note 20, at 1143 (noting that after the Second World War the place of
the corporation in the law ceased to be controversial).
161. Id.
162. Branson, supra note 24, at 1211-12.
163. Id. at 1212. See also LINDBLOM, supra note 23 and accompanying text (addressing the
increasingly prevalent view of the corporate entity as a quasi-governmental or quasi-public body).
164. Branson, supra note 24, at 1211.
165. Id. at 1208. This position was advanced by Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel
Seligman. Id.
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federal standards for shareholder rights, directors' fiduciary duties, and
litigation.'66  Others called for weighted voting schemes to give
individual shareholders more power, 167 federal laws mandating public
interest directors for major corporations, 68  and corporate social
accounting. 1
69
The radical nature of many of the proposed reforms drew an equally
harsh response from advocates of corporate autonomy. In particular,
the corporate social responsibility movement was quickly countered by
the law and economics movement, which has been a pervasive influence
in corporate law for at least the last twenty years. 170  Law and
economics, the neoclassical version of corporate law, can be traced to
Alchian and Demsetz' landmark 1972 article, 17 1 which drew "on
neoclassical conceptions of contract to devise a radical rejection of the
managerialist approach.' 72  Law and economics scholars generally
advocated that "market forces regulated corporate executives' behavior
far better than laws and lawsuits ever could.' 73  According to
neoclassical scholars, "the firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus
166. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
167. See David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on
the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-53 (1970) (advocating a one
man, one vote policy in order to decentralize corporate power and redistribute it in the hands of
individual stockholders).
168. See Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 50-53 (1966) (drawing ideas from the German management
system in which a supervisory council is chosen by shareholders and workers together in order to
watch over the management of the company, yet not interfere with it).
169. See Douglas M. Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments
for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539, 580 (1976) (arguing
that social accounting techniques need to be put into practice as opposed to just researched).
170. Branson, supra note 24, at 1215-16. As Branson notes, "[sleldom will one ever witness
such a jurisprudential shift as that from federal chartering of corporations to contractarianism."
Id. at 1216.
171. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972). Neoclassicism also had roots in institutional
economics, which originated with Ronald H. Coase. Coase compared and contrasted firms and
markets, and identified transaction costs as the major factor influencing the choice between the
two. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-94 (1937). Coase's theory
resurfaced in the institutional variant of the law and economics movement during the 1970s, also
discussed infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
172. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1477.
173. Branson, supra note 24, at 1209; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) (discussing market regulation); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89 (1985) (advocating limited legal restraints on corporations); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981) (discussing market constraints on directors' actions).
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for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of
production."'' 74 The role of corporate management is to facilitate "a
continuous process of negotiation of successive contracts." 175
Within a corporation, "rational economic actors" attempt to avoid
agency costs in contracting. Because agency costs are inefficient, "the
party who most reduces agency costs has the edge," and "the lowest
cost contract 'forms' survive." 176  Also, because "managers will
maximize their own welfare," shareholders bid down the prices of
securities, thus "[m]anagement thereby bears the cost of its own
misconduct and has an incentive to control its own behavior."
1 77
Finally, because misconduct involves an agency cost, minimizing
agency costs naturally occurs in the process of contracting, and the
result is that the market effectively regulates corporate behavior. This
implies an extremely limited role for corporate law, for there is little
reason for the government to intervene. In this manner, the
neoclassical movement represents a refinement of both the artificial
entity and aggregate entity metaphors; a corporation is a fiction and
those who run it facilitate contracting among its various components.
1 79
Law and economics theory proved an effective counterpoint to the
social responsibility movement. In particular, it fit well with the general
trend in the law favoring corporate autonomy. Because law and
economics scholars viewed the corporate entity as contractual in nature,
there was no need for government policing; "private actors do a better
job at making contracts than do government officials... [so there is]
little constructive role for public policy."' 80 This approach harkens back
to aggregate theory, but with even less need for administrative
oversight.' 81 If a corporation is a group of contracting economic actors,
and the market now exists inside the firm, there is no need to interfere
other than to protect the market's integrity.
While the law and economics movement dominated the academic
literature during much of the 1980s, the corporate social responsibility
movement is once again gaining momentum. Social responsibility
advocates have responded to the unrestrained law and economics model
174. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1478.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1479.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1480.
179. Id. at 1478.
180. Bratton, supra note 38, at 1482.
181. See supra Part I1.B (discussing the aggregate entity theory).
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with a progressive ideology. 8 2  Modem theorists are increasingly
beginning to look past attempts to fit the corporate entity into a
preexisting legal framework and are focusing on the role of the
corporate entity in society. Many theorists view the modem business
corporation as a quasi-public actor. For example, some progressive
scholars support a "communitarian" view of the corporation, focusing
on the corporate entity's broader societal role.' 83 As Professor Mitchell
notes, "[t]he very power that corporations have over our lives means
that, intentionally or not, they profoundly affect our lives.' 84  Other
progressive scholars have advocated federally mandated social auditing
and disclosure.'85 This progressive ideology is motivated by the power
and influence of the modem business corporation. Modem business
corporations increasingly "operate as multi-tiered multinational
groups,"' 18 6 often with concentrated power exceeding that of individual
nations. As Branson notes, "[tihe rapidly accelerating growth in
number and in size of huge Multinational Corporations... poses
pressing problems for the twenty-first century."'87  With the dramatic
increase in multinational corporations, regulatory measures are
becoming increasingly difficult to implement because corporate entities
operate in so many different countries. Yet, the reality is that modem
business corporations operate within the boundaries of nations and
impact their citizens on a level that historically has only been matched
by governmental institutions.
The resurgence in the debate over corporate personality during the
last thirty years demonstrates that corporate theorists have still not
settled on the proper way to characterize the corporate entity. The
history of corporate personality doctrine reflects a struggle to fit the
182. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (detailing the progressive ideology's
position on corporate ethics).
183. Branson, supra note 24, at 1217.
184. MITCHELL, supra note 24, at xiii. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing pervasiveness of the modem business corporation).
185. See Branson, supra note 24, at 1221 (discussing a regulation or statute that would require
a substantial degree of corporate social accounting and disclosure). See also Cynthia A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1273-99 (1999) (advocating for a corporate social transparency statute).
According to Bratton, the history of corporate law has a constant theme, "[tihe corporate entity
rises, posing challenges to both economic and legal theory." Bratton, supra note 38, at 1482.
The law must then attempt to deal with the new challenges. In this manner, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act can be seen as a progressive response to unbridled discretion on behalf of corporate
managers. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
186. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 298.
187. Branson, supra note 24, at 1211.
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corporate entity into traditional legal practices. This is no easy task, for
corporations do not readily fit within the American legal tradition. Yet,
the gradual acceptance of corporate personality by the Supreme Court
has resulted in a modem business corporation that is treated like a
natural person under the Constitution.1 88  The pervasive power and
influence of the modem business corporation makes this analogy
inherently unstable, especially in light of the Court's refusal to examine
properly what it means to be a constitutional person. The fact that
corporate theory itself is unstable and includes many competing theories
of the corporate entity, demonstrates that there is no one answer to the
corporate personality debate. Therefore, the adoption of corporate
personality in constitutional doctrine is especially troubling. The
following Part examines the Court's use of the various corporate
metaphors to grant constitutional rights to corporations.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD AND THE CORPORATE METAPHOR
Corporate theorists have attempted to analogize the corporate entity
to the individual person presumed by the American legal tradition since
America's founding. 89 This process has influenced the development of
the law, for jurists have also struggled to fit the corporate entity into a
preexisting legal framework. The problem presented by the corporate
entity is particularly striking in constitutional law, for "the Constitution
does not uniformly describe the parties it protects."' 90  Rather, the
Constitution "refers to 'person' or 'citizens' or 'people"' without
specifically describing the characteristics each possesses, or whether the
terms extend beyond their facial meanings. 91  Therefore, the
Constitution contains the same inadequacies with respect to the
corporate entity as does the common law, for it also describes legal
relationships in terms of individuals. As a result, the Court has been
forced to find the proper way to fit the corporate entity into a
preexisting legal terminology.
In the Court's corporate constitutional jurisprudence, the Court has
never set forth a specific test to determine what a constitutional
"person" is. Legal personhood is often a conclusion rather than a
threshold question. Instead, each of the previously discussed metaphors
of the corporate entity have been used to justify different corporate
188. See supra Part II.C (explaining how the corporation as a legal actor, endowed with
certain rights, became accepted doctrine).
189. See supra Part H1 (discussing the American legal tradition of personifying corporations
and the resulting development of the corporate personality doctrine).
190. Blumberg, supra note 19, at 300.
191. Id.
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constitutional rights. In fact, multiple theories have been invoked in the
same case, and have even been applied in interpreting different clauses
of the same Amendment. 192 By so doing, the Court has formulated a
constitutional "person" that is distinguishable from the natural person to
whom the terms used in the Constitution seem to refer. 93 This Part first
addresses the Court's early cases involving corporate constitutional
rights 94  and then examines modem corporate constitutional
jurisprudence. 195
A. The Foundation of Corporate Constitutional Rights
Corporate personality and the use of corporate metaphors are by no
means a novel concept in constitutional jurisprudence. In fact, the use
of different metaphors to justify different results can be traced back to
the Court's earliest corporate cases. 196  For example, the Court's
holdings with regard to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction embody the
earliest example of this discrepancy.' 97 These cases demonstrate that the
Court has freely bought into corporate theory in addressing corporate
rights under the Constitution for nearly two hundred years. The
foundational cases thus create a problem for stare decisis, for the Court
has consistently failed to engage in rigorous constitutional interpretation
in determining corporate rights.
The term "citizens" was also the subject of the Court's interpretation
of the Privileges and Immunities clauses of Article IV' 98 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 9 In contrast with the Court's decisions with
regard to the case or controversy clause, the Court has consistently
192. See supra Part II (detailing the theories behind the corporate personality doctrine: the
artificial entity theory, the aggregate entity theory, and the real entity theory).
193. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment uses the terms "persons" and "citizens." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Amendment begins with the phrase "[aill persons born or
naturalized in the United States." Id. Nothing in the text implies that the terms were meant to
apply to anything other than natural persons or human beings.
194. See infra Part IILA (discussing the Court's initial interpretation of corporate
constitutional rights).
195. See infra Part III.B (examining the Court's recent interpretation of corporate
constitutional rights).
196. See supra Part II (discussing the Court's adoption of the artificial entity theory, the
aggregate entity theory, and the real entity theory, when addressing corporate constitutional
rights).
197. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court switched from
the aggregate entity metaphor to the artificial entity metaphor in its cases addressing corporate
citizenship, but kept the same result). The diversity of citizenship requirement is contained in the
"case or controversy" clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
198. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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refused to recognize the corporate entity as a "citizen" under the
Privileges and Immunities clauses. For example, in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle,2 ° the Taney Court used the artificial entity theory to hold that
corporations were not citizens under Article IV.201  Because a
corporation was not a citizen, the Court affirmed a state statute that
discriminated against foreign corporations 202  While this decision came
prior to the Taney Court's findings of corporate citizenship in Letson
and Marshall, the rationale of Earle was later upheld in Paul v.
Virginia.2 °3 In that case, Justice Field wrote for the majority that "[t]he
term citizens... applies only to natural persons ... not to artificial
persons created by the legislature." 204 The Court's examination of the
term "citizen" under the Fourteenth Amendment, also adopted in 1868,
led to a similar conclusion.0 5 In Pembina Consolidated Mining &
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,2 °6 Justice Field, again writing for the Court,
stated that the term "citizens" in the Fourteenth Amendment was
207
similarly inapplicable to corporations °. As these decisions use the
same artificial entity metaphor as Letson, they are indistinguishable
conceptually and reflect a concern with shareholder liability rather than
reasoned constitutional analysis.0 8
Though the use of corporate personality metaphors began with the
Court's decisions regarding the interpretation of the word "citizen,"
corporate personality became a dominant theme in constitutional
jurisprudence as the Court began considering the term "person." The
term is used in several constitutional provisions, and has likewise been
interpreted in a confusing and disparate manner. In contrast to the
200. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1829).
201. Id. at 587-88.
202. Id. Blumberg noted that the Court's decision was based on a concern "with the
implications of a contrary decision resting on the associational theory for the limited liability of
shareholders." Blumberg, supra note 19, at 306. By separating the corporation from its
shareholders, the Court was able to protect limited liability, another ad hoc use of corporate
personality.
203. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); see also supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions in Letson and Marshall).
204. Paul, 75 U.S. at 177.
205. The Fourteenth Amendment differs from Article IV in that it defines "citizen" as
"persons born or naturalized in the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. This reflects
the fact that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to protect emancipated
African-Americans from disparate government treatment. See Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the
Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 9, 53 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court deliberations during Brown v. Board of
Education).
206. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
207. Id. at 187-88.
208. See supra notes 104-09 (discussing result of Santa Clara and Pembina).
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Court's decisions that a corporation is not a constitutional "citizen," the
Court has consistently held since Santa Clara that a corporation is a
constitutional "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 9  The
Court's decisions in the Santa Clara line of cases are conclusory; the
Court never addressed why a corporation should be treated as a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead relied on corporate
metaphors to analogize the corporate entity to the "person" described in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 '0  This lack of reasoning and analysis is
troubling given that Santa Clara has proven to be a fountainhead for all
other corporate constitutional rights. This suggests a foundational issue
for later adjudications of corporate personhood. 21 ' This foundational
problem becomes more apparent when considering the Court's use of
corporate metaphors in other cases decided during this time period.
In Pembina, the Court extended the constitutional personhood
recognized in Santa Clara to the Due Process Clause as well as the
Equal Protection Clause, while at the same time declining to recognize a
corporation as a "citizen" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.1 2 While stating that a corporation was an
artificial person under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and thus
not a "citizen," the Court also held that corporations are "merely
associations of individuals" for purposes of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. 2 3  Thus, the Court used different corporate
metaphors to justify different results in interpreting different clauses of
the same amendment in the same opinion.
209. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of corporate
metaphors to find that a corporation is a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment).
210. In Santa Clara, the Court stated that it did "not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to those
corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does." Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118
U.S. 394, 396 (1886). In Pembina, decided two years later, the Court acknowledged its reliance
on the aggregate entity metaphor in Santa Clara, stating "corporations are merely associations of
individuals united for a special purpose .... [t]he equal protection of the laws which these bodies
may claim is only such as is accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the State."
Pembina, 125 U.S. at 189. However, the Santa Clara holding also reflects the Court's reliance
on the artificial entity metaphor; the holding resulted in a legal fiction, for the corporate entity
was able to conduct litigation in its own name. See Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1643 (avoiding
naming the corporations' shareholders in the litigation).
211. This foundational issue is especially important given the radical difference between
corporations, which existed at the time Santa Clara was decided and modem business
corporations. Santa Clara is the basis of corporate constitutional rights, but the Court has never
revisited the issue to determine whether the modem business corporation should be treated in
such a manner. This issue is addressed further infra Part III.B.
212. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 188-89.
213. Id. at 189.
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In Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford,2 4 the
Court again addressed the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to
corporations. In that case, the Court simply stated, "[i]t is now settled
that corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of
law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 2t 5 In 1910,
the Court again changed its analysis with regard to corporations'
Fourteenth Amendment status but kept the previous result. In Southern
Railway Co. v. Greene,21 6 the Court stated, "[t]hat a corporation is a
person, within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, is no longer open
to discussion., 217 The Court quoted Pembina for the proposition that a
corporation is a "person," but omitted the portion of the Pembina
opinion stating that corporations were "merely associations of
individuals. 218 By doing so, the Court implicitly adopted the emerging
theory of the corporate entity as a real person, entitled to the same rights
as individuals .2 9 Therefore, in the span of only twenty-two years, the
Court used all three metaphors of corporate personality to interpret the
corporate entity's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The result was essentially the same in each case, for
corporations retained their constitutional rights throughout this line of
cases; only the analysis changed.
The Court's decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment at the turn of
the century affirmed "the developing judicial principle that the
corporation and the sole proprietorship are merely alternative forms of
business organization., 220  The recognition that a corporation was a
constitutional person under the Fourteenth Amendment set the stage for
increasing corporate rights through substantive due process, such that
today, corporations have nearly all of the rights that individuals do.22'
Yet, the Court's willingness to rapidly change its analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment is troublesome, for it implies hasty and flawed
constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the Court has never developed
a test for what comprises a constitutional "person." It is well accepted
214. 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
215. Id. at 592.
216. 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
217. Id. at412.
218. Id. at 412-13; Pembina, 125 U.S. at 189.
219. There are a few limited exceptions to corporations' constitutional rights, which will be
discussed infra Part III.B. See also supra Part II.C (discussing the growth of the real entity theory
and its recent role in the Court's expansion of corporate constitutional rights).
220. Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1641-42.
221. See infra Part III.B (examining the Court's modem jurisprudence allowing a corporation
to be viewed as a constitutional person).
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that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to protect
newly freed slaves and designed it to counteract the "black codes"
passed by southern states in response to the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment.222 Yet, under the Fourteenth Amendment the Court has
created corporate constitutional rights not implied by the text of the
Constitution or the intent of its framers. 23 Nowhere in the text or the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment is there a suggestion that it was
meant to create constitutional persons as opposed to natural persons,
particularly legal fictions such as corporate persons.224
B. Modem Corporate Constitutional Rights
Although Santa Clara and its progeny contain no analysis of why a
corporation should be viewed as a constitutional "person," they have
proven to be the basis for the expansion of corporate constitutional
rights. This creates an inherent problem in this body of law, for such
rights do not follow under nearly any theory of constitutional
interpretation. As noted, interpreting the text in accordance with its
common usage and the intent of the Framers would not yield the rights
which corporations have been granted. 25 If the Constitution is viewed
as a living document, subject to changing interpretation as society
develops, corporate constitutional rights still do not necessarily
follow, 226 for this method of interpretation is usually focused on
222. See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 1863-
1869, 109-13 (1990) (discussing the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment).
223. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 169-70, 329-30 (1990) (examining the Court's expansion of protections guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 24-25, 39 (Antonin Scalia & Amy Gutmann,
eds., 1997). Other substantive due process rights are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be
discussed only where pertinent.
224. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 578 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect African-Americans from white
oppression, not to protect corporations).
225. See Scalia, supra note 223, at 47 ("If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew,
they will ... write it the way the majority wants .... This, of course, is the end of the Bill of
Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the
majority.").
226. Many commentators believe that the Framers' definitions of certain terms should not
bind courts from interpreting the Constitution as the need for new applications develop. See, e.g.,
Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 223, at 85-86
(asserting that existing constitutional provisions may acquire new meaning when the Constitution
is amended). For example, some advocate reading the Constitution "to respond to the existing
and often changing social or economic conditions." BARRY R. SCHALLER, A VISION OF
AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE TELL 120-21 (1997).
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expanding individual rights.227 Reading the Constitution in a manner
that grants individual rights to institutions, such as modem business
corporations, which function as quasi-public entities, is counterintuitive
even under a progressive approach to constitutional interpretation.
228
Yet, this is exactly the result the Court's decisions reach. The current
doctrine merely builds upon the original cases, such as Santa Clara. No
subsequent decisions have elaborated on corporate "personhood";
rather, the recent cases merely refer to the propositions established in
229the older cases. Moreover, the constitutional personhood of
corporations has rarely been challenged. 230 The Court seems simply to
accept as a matter of stare decisis that corporations are persons under
the Constitution.
Four years before Greene applied the real entity theory to
corporations in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
considered whether corporations were entitled to the protections of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Hale v. Henkel.2 1 In that case, the
Court relied on the artificial entity theory to hold that corporations are
not protected by the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 2 The Court stated that "the corporation is a creature of
the State... presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the
227. See, e.g., Tribe, in A MA'TTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 223, at 86 n.50 (citing
numerous examples of expansions of individual rights that alter existing constitutional provisions
after the enactment of various amendments).
228. To do so would be to continue the current trend in corporate constitutional jurisprudence,
for the corporate entity would still have to be analogized to, and reconciled with, an individual
person.
229. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) ("It is well
established that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
In Bellotti, the Court considered whether a state statute restricting corporate funds spent for the
purpose of influencing voters was constitutional under the First Amendment. First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 (1978). While the Court focused on the speech at issue rather than the
speaker, see Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1014, the Court did include a footnote discussing
personhood. The Court noted that "purely personal" guarantees were unavailable to corporations
"because the 'historic function of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14. The Court went on to state "[w]hether or not a
particular guarantee is 'purely personal' ... depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the
particular constitutional provision." Id. However, the Court has never elaborated on this test, or
applied it in other circumstances.
230. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("It requires distortion to read 'person' as meaning one thing, then another within the
same clause and from clause to clause. It means, in my opinion, a substantial revision of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("I do not believe the word 'person' in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
corporations.").
231. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
232. Id. at 70; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Interpreting the Corporate Person
public. 233 Yet, in the same case, the Court used the aggregate theory to
protect corporations from unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.234  That portion of the opinion states, "[a]
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. 235  The Court's
distinctions do not turn on different terminology in the text of the
Amendments; both use the word "persons., 236 Thus, the Court used two
different metaphors of the corporation in the same case to justify
different results, a mere four years before adopting the real entity
approach in Greene. The decision remains good law, for the Court still
holds that corporations do not have a right against self-incrimination, 37
238but do have a right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Particularly interesting with regard to the Court's decisions on the
Fifth Amendment is the manner in which it has applied the Double
Jeopardy Clause 239 to corporations. The Double Jeopardy Clause
contains the same reference to the term "person" as the Self-
incrimination Clause, follows immediately after it in the constitutional
text, and is in fact part of the same clause. In addition, the Double
Jeopardy Clause seems to refer also to natural persons, for it discusses
"jeopardy of life or limb"; 24' it would take quite an imagination to
envision a corporation in danger of being deprived of either literally.
Yet, despite its refusal to grant protection against self-incrimination to
corporations, the Court has consistently held that corporations are
242
entitled to double jeopardy protection. The Court has never explained
why a corporation is a person for purposes of double jeopardy, but not
for purposes of self-incrimination, despite the fact that the use of the
term "persons" in the clause is analytically indistinguishable. While the
233. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
234. Id. at 71; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
235. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
236. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V.
237. See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) ("The constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.").
238. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) ("Dow plainly has
a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered
buildings ....").
239. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
240. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... .
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (reasoning
that policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause, to protect accused from "embarrassment,
expense and ordeal," apply to corporations as well (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187-88 (1957)).
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artificial entity theory used in the context of the Self-incrimination
Clause would appear to be equally applicable to the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court has declined to use the metaphor in that context.
In a recent line of cases, the Court has extended First Amendment
protection to corporations as well. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council,2 43 the Court held that
commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment, noting that
the First Amendment applies to communication generally.2 " This case
signaled a "transformation of the First Amendment to a protector of
'speech' rather than 'freedom' . . . [and] ease[d] the simple extension of
First Amendment rights to corporations., 245 Two years later, in First
National Bank v. Bellotti,246 the Court explicitly dealt with the question
of corporate free speech rights. In that case, the Court held that a
Massachusetts statute restricting political spending by corporations to
influence public referenda was unconstitutional.247 The majority refused
to focus on corporate personality, noting "[t]he proper question is not
whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. 248  Rather, the
question the Court considered was "whether [the statute] abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 249  By
focusing on "the right of public discussion," the Court avoided
addressing corporate personality theory entirely.
The Court's reasoning in Bellotti, focusing on the speech itself rather
than the nature of the speaker, has been expanded in subsequent
decisions. For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,251 the Court again focused on the public's interest
in the free dissemination of information rather than the speaker.252
However, the Court soon began to narrow the application of the
corporate speech doctrine, emphasizing the potential of powerful
corporations to dilute the marketplace of ideas. In Federal Election
243. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
244. Id. at 756.
245. Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1015.
246. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
247. Id. at 795.
248. Id. at 776.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 792. However, Justice Rehnquist engaged in such a discussion, characterizing the
corporation as an artificial entity, subject to State constraints. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
251. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
252. Id. at 8.
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Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,253 the Court struck down
a federal law prohibiting corporate spending in connection with a
federal election because it applied to for-profit and nonprofit
corporations alike.254 The Court noted that the restriction might have
been constitutional if designed to combat the "corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth," but could not be upheld as applied
because the same dangers did not exist with regard to nonprofit
corporations.255 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,56 the
Court expanded on this reasoning, upholding a similar state law as
applied to a nonprofit corporation whose members were for-profit
corporations. The Court stated that the restriction was focused on "a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas. 257
In the development of corporate free speech rights, the Court seems
to be toeing the line between allowing a free marketplace of ideas and
preventing that marketplace from becoming diluted by corporate power.
The Court's decisions suggest that the primary concern is the speech
itself, not the speaker. However, commentators have suggested that the
lack of concern regarding the speaker is inappropriate, for the speaker
certainly does matter when the speaker is a modern business
258corporation. Moreover, it is impossible to detach all aspects of
corporate personality even if the Court purports to be focused on the
speech itself. Free speech protection focuses, at least in part, "on the
positive role of the free speech guarantee as a catalyst in tapping and
developing the uniquely human creative and intellectual capacities of
the individual. 259  While free speech is often phrased as a negative
right, protecting the individual from government interference, it is
equally true that free speech is intrinsic to "the very exercise of one's
freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate, or learn [and] represents a
253. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
254. Id. at 241.
255. Id. at 257-59.
256. 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
257. Id. at 660.
258. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 24, at 1067-69 (arguing that corporations have a
distinctive viewpoint created by the "law of fiduciary duties to fictional shareholders and
enforced by market and legal pressures that do not need to reflect the view of any human being at
all").
259. Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical
Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 618, 627 (1987-1988).
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use, and therefore a development, of an individual's uniquely human
faculties.",26° Thus, the Court's willingness to grant corporations free
speech rights, while limited, implicitly suggests a continuance of the
real entity theory, placing corporations on a level playing field with
individuals. The Court does not hesitate to referee when a corporation's
intrinsic power begins to skew the field. However, the Court's
corporate First Amendment jurisprudence also represents a continuance
of its generally ad hoc approach to corporate constitutional rights.
In summary, the Court's development of corporate constitutional
rights reflects the Court's willingness to adopt various corporate
metaphors in its attempts to analogize the corporate entity to a person.
Santa Clara, the first decision to recognize a corporation as a "person,"
contained no analysis as to why this analogy was proper. In the Court's
subsequent cases, the Court has adopted all three of the major corporate
metaphors in granting corporations individual rights, often describing
the corporate entity with different metaphors in the same case. The fact
that all three metaphors are still debated in corporate theory
demonstrates that the doctrine is inherently unstable. Thus, the Court's
willingness to use these corporate metaphors is particularly flawed in
light of their use as a basis for constitutional rights. To date, the Court
has still not defined what a constitutional "person" is. The following
Part sets forth a framework for examining the corporate rights
consistent with the Constitution and suggests that these rights should
not be extended to corporations absent a finding that the corporate entity
should be entitled to the right at issue for the same reasons a natural
person would be entitled to such rights.
IV. A NEW ANALYTIC APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD
The question of constitutional personhood should be a threshold
question in determining whether an entity is entitled to constitutional
protection. Most of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
were designed as barriers between the government and individual
citizens. Though it is beyond debate that the corporate entity is an
important participant in the American sociopolitical process, it should
never be assumed that such an entity is entitled to constitutional
protections equal to an individual citizen without detailed analysis.
Modern business corporations have the capacity to aggregate enough
power and influence to rival governmental institutions. Given the
pervasiveness of modern business corporations, it is "difficult to deny
corporate activity's enormous impact on both the nation's welfare and
260. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 21 (1984).
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the government's success. '2 6 ' As such, they have "become a kind of
public official, and exercise what, on a broad view of their role, are
public functions. 262  Such public entities simply do not stand in the
same position as individual citizens in relation to government.
Therefore, the Court should consider carefully the basis of such entities'
claims to a constitutional right before assuming that they are equally
entitled to constitutional protection.
A. Interpreting the Constitutional "Person"
As a matter of ordinary constitutional interpretation, a corporation is
simply not a "person." Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a "person" is
entitled to "due process" and "the equal protection of the laws., 263 This
clause has generally been interpreted to grant those deserving of its
protection the same rights against state interference as the Bill of Rights
guarantees with relation to the federal government. Because
corporations are largely governed by state law, the practical effect of
declaring corporations "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment is to
grant them the protections contained within the Bill of Rights. This has
indeed been the result of Santa Clara and its progeny, as corporations
have gradually been granted individual rights and today claim almost all
of the constitutional rights that natural persons have.2 4
It is beyond debate that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
corporations on its face. 265  There is no reference in the text of the
Amendment to corporations, nor is "person" defined to include anything
266
other than a natural person. It is also beyond debate that the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment is devoid of any intent to include
corporations within its protections.267  Instead, the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that its Framers intended it to
provide protections, procedural and substantive, for newly freed
slaves. 268 For more than a century, these protections have been extended
261. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 22, at 246.
262. LINDBLOM, supra note 23, at 172.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
264. For example, corporations have not yet been granted the right against self-incrimination.
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 99 (1988) (holding that corporations have no
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment).
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
266. Id.
267. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be construed as applying to corporations
because the history of the amendment indicated that it was only to apply to the protection of
former slaves).
268. See MALTZ, supra note 222, at 109-13 (discussing the purpose of the Fourteenth
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to protect other groups of people, particularly "discrete and insular
minorities. 269
Considering the Court's approach to the Fourteenth Amendment
since the early twentieth century, it is beyond dispute that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protections reach beyond its literal
interpretation. However, its expansion must be placed into context.
Modem substantive due process, for example, "specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty[,]' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.... ,2o Presupposed in most modem substantive
due process cases is the fact that the litigant is a "person" as defined in
the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Roe v. Wade,271 the Court
addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment the constitutional validity
of a state law prohibiting abortions. Responding to the argument that a
fetus was a "person" entitled to due process protection, the Court held
that a fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment.272
Subsequent cases involving abortion rights have affirmed this
distinction.273  However, the Court rarely draws such a distinction in
discussing a corporation's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.274
Given that much of the expansion in the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning has involved individual rights that apply only to natural
persons, it would be improper to infer that its expansion to include the
rights of corporations is similar. Even accepting without argument that
the Court's expansion of the substantive due process rights of natural
persons is constitutionally supportable, the Court has never attempted to
explain why corporations should be treated as "persons" under the
Constitution.
B. A Foundational Problem and Stare Decisis
The Court's holdings in cases addressing corporate constitutional
rights demonstrate that there is a foundational problem with corporate
Amendment).
269. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
270. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325-26 (1937)).
271. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
272. Id. at 158.
273. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade).
274. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 ("It is well established that
a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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constitutional rights.275  In Santa Clara and its progeny, the Court
established that a corporation is a "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In subsequent cases, the Court has expanded on this
proposition to extend nearly all rights contained within the Bill of
276Rights to corporations. However, the Court has never engaged in any
preliminary analysis of what it means to be a constitutional "person,"
and whether a corporation should be treated as one. Moreover, the
Court has used all three metaphors of corporate theory in this line of
cases to analogize the corporate entity to a natural person. Corporate
theory has yet to settle on the proper method of viewing corporate
personality, yet the Court has relied on these metaphors as a basis of
constitutional rights. These metaphors are conclusory, and serve as a
mere justification rather than a method of analysis.
Given the faulty basis for corporate constitutional rights, the Court
has no obligation to adhere to stare decisis in this area of law. In Casey,
the Court set forth "a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the
,,277ideal of the rule of law.. .. For example, the Court stated that a
prior holding should be overruled when "related principles of law have
so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine. 2 78 The Court also considered "whether facts have
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification. ' 79
Under this test, the Court should dramatically revise its method of
addressing the constitutional rights of modem business corporations.
Santa Clara did not contain any reasoning or analysis as to why a
corporation should be treated as a person. The use of corporate
metaphors as a method of determining corporate constitutional rights
should be deemed "abandoned doctrine," for corporate theorists have
not agreed on the proper conception of the corporate entity in over two
hundred years of debate.28°  In addition, the reality of the corporate
275. See supra Part IV.A (finding that corporations do not have explicit protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment nor was the amendment intended to include them as "persons").
276. See infra Part IV.B (illustrating that the Court has relied on precedent to expand the
application of "personhood" and its related protections to corporations).
277. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
278. Id. at 885.
279. Id.
280. In addition, these theories have developed coextensively with the economic and social
development of the social entity. This creates a chicken and egg dilemma. Because the theories
are always changing, they are inherently unreliable as a basis of constitutional rights. Justice
Douglas recognized this problem in his dissent in Wheeling Steel Corp., where he stated: "It
requires distortion to read 'person' as meaning one thing, then another within the same clause and
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entity has changed drastically since the time the Court first granted
corporations constitutional personhood. The modem business
corporation does not need protection from government any more than
the government itself does. 281' Given this, the Court should stop
following the conclusory analysis of the older cases and begin asking a
fundamental, preliminary question: when is a corporation like an
individual person, and when is it not?
C. A Proper Analysis of Constitutional "Persons"
The adjudication of corporate constitutional rights, as with all other
rights, should begin with proper constitutional interpretation. While the
Court has bypassed the question of whether a corporation is a
constitutional "person" in most of its cases, that question should always
be preliminary to the grant of a specific constitutional right. Given that
the intent to include corporations within the Constitution's purview
cannot be found anywhere in the text or the history of the document, a
more refined method of constitutional interpretation is needed in this
instance. The Constitution is a foundational document, and it should
not be interpreted to preclude the granting of any right not envisioned
by its Framers. American society has changed much since the time of
the Constitution's adoption, and any document, which is to govern such
a society properly must be flexible to a certain extent. The Constitution
should not be interpreted in so strict a manner as to preclude
corporations from receiving constitutional recognition. However, the
manner in which they are recognized must be consistent with the
purpose of the right at issue.
To interpret a corporation's rights properly under the Constitution,
the Court should examine the right at issue "in light of the values and
policies that are thought to underlie it." '282  Such a method of
interpretation is not without Supreme Court precedent, even in the
context of corporate constitutional rights. In United States v. White,283
the Court used such an analysis in determining whether a corporation
should be granted the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. There, the Court considered whether the "historic
from clause to clause." Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
281. The Court itself has acknowledged the expansive power of the modem business
corporations in its First Amendment cases. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text
(discussing potential corrosive effect of corporate speech). This reasoning should be expanded,
for it is not only in the area of speech that corporations wield power and influence.
282. DAN-COHEN, supra note 26, at 86.
283. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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function" of the protection was such that it should only apply to
individuals.284 This line of reasoning was expanded in Bellotti, where
the Court considered whether a state statute restricting corporate funds
spent for the purpose of influencing voters was constitutional under the
First Amendment.285 In a footnote, the Court cited White, noting that
"purely personal" guarantees were unavailable to corporations "because
the 'historic function of the particular guarantee has been limited to the
protection of individuals." 28 6 The Court went on to state, "[w]hether or
not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' ... depends on the
nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional
provision. ' "
While the Bellotti test corresponds with more traditional methods of
constitutional interpretation, it is contradicted by another case decided
only one year earlier. In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,288
the Court considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause, also found in
the Fifth Amendment, applied to corporations. There, the Court held
that corporations were indeed entitled to the protection, noting that the
"purpose" of the clause is to prevent the state from making "repeated
attempts to convict the accused, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity .... ,,289 This language
suggests the presence of the real entity metaphor, not a true analysis of
the purpose of the clause. Thus, while the word "person" in the Fifth
Amendment applies to both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Self-
incrimination Clause (which are contained within the same textual
sentence), the Court reached a different result in each instance. In light
of the Bellotti test, set forth one year later, it remains unclear why the
right against self-incrimination is "purely personal," while the right
against double jeopardy is not.
Despite the internal inconsistency in the Court's holdings, the Court's
focus in White and Bellotti is on the proper preliminary question: when
should a corporation be deemed a "person" under the Constitution, and
when should it not? For this reason, the analysis in White and Bellotti
should be expanded, thus providing a precedential "hook" for a new
analytical approach. The focus in those cases properly centers on the
historical background and purpose of the provision at issue, thus
284. Id. at 698-701.
285. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
286. Id. at 778 n.14 (quoting White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701).
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
289. Id. at 569 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
2005]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
corresponding with traditional methods of constitutional interpretation.
By addressing the values and policies underlying each right, the Court
would ensure that the corporate entity actually should be entitled to the
right at issue at the outset. More explicitly, a corporation would only be
entitled to a constitutional right if the values and policies underlying the
right are such that the reasons a natural person is entitled to the right
apply equally to a corporation. Thus, a corporation would only be
granted constitutional personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment if
the application of that Amendment to the specific right at issue satisfies
this threshold requirement. This would prevent corporations being
granted constitutional rights on the basis of debatable theories of
personhood and ensure that the guarantees contained within the
Constitution apply only to those entities deserving of them.290  By
applying this test, the Court could place the modem business
corporation in its proper societal context.
The application of this threshold test does not necessarily mean that
corporations are not entitled to constitutional rights. An application of
the test to the privilege against self-incrimination is illustrative. In
White, the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege "grows out
of the high sentiment and regard of our jurisprudence for conducting
criminal trials and investigatory proceedings upon a plane of dignity,
humanity, and impartiality. 29' If the purpose of the clause-as
determined by examining the values and policies that the right is
premised upon-is to provide procedural impartiality and fairness, the
corporate entity should be entitled to it equally as an individual person.
This is because, under this rationale, the right is not based on its
application to a certain type of actor. Rather, it is based on providing a
certain type of legal system. The purpose of the right itself would not
be compromised if the corporate entity were entitled to it as well as
natural persons.
To provide another example, it would likewise seem inherently unfair
to suggest that a corporation is not entitled to trial by jury under the
Sixth or Seventh Amendments.292 This right appears to be equally
focused on procedural fairness, not the actor to whom the right applies.
A corporation is not required to have "personality" to deserve the right.
Rather, the procedural safeguards of the right to a jury trial are meant to
ensure that the actor subject to the legal processes is given an
290. The amendment process provides an additional (and more traditional) route for the
expansion of corporate rights, should a certain right be found inapplicable to corporations under
the above test.
291. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
292. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII.
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appropriate hearing before legal rights are taken away. As a corporation
certainly has legal rights under state law, a corporation is equally
deserving of the right.
To provide a contrary example, if the purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause is to prevent the accused from being subjected to
"'embarrassment, 
... anxiety and insecurity[,]' '2 93 the right would not
seem to apply to a corporation. Absent an attempt to personify a
corporation, it is difficult to see how a corporation can experience these
emotions equally as a natural person. On the other hand, if the purpose
of the clause were to prevent "expense and ordeal, '2 94 a corporation
would seem to be entitled to the right. A corporation can certainly be
burdened by financial expense and lengthy trial proceedings.
Finally, the Court's current trend in corporate free speech doctrine
demonstrates how this test may be applied as well. The Court's current
focus in free speech cases is on the integrity of the marketplace of
ideas.295 Under this focus, the purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to
allow the public free access to ideas.296 Therefore, a corporation would
be equally entitled to disseminate its ideas to the public as an individual
person; the underlying purpose of the clause does not require that the
right remain exclusive to individual citizens. The Court's recent
decisions indicate that it is beginning to inquire whether the speaker
matters. The Court has even discussed the quasi-public nature of the
corporate entity in this context.297 The Court's decisions reflect its
willingness to examine whether the reasons a natural person is entitled
to free speech rights apply equally to a corporation. A corporation is
entitled to free speech rights because it is equally capable of
contributing to the marketplace of ideas as an individual citizen.
However, because its contributions are more capable of diluting the
marketplace (and thus undermining the purpose of the right), the
government may regulate the corporate entity's contributions more
stringently .98
293. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 184, 187-88).
294. Id.
295. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (focusing on the
public's interest in the free dissemination of information rather than the speaker).
296. Id. The counterpoint is the idea that free speech exists to allow individuals to develop
their human capacities; absent free expression and exposure to ideas, humans would be stunted
educationally. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text (addressing developmental aspect
of free speech). Under this point of view, the purpose of the free speech clause would preclude
its application to corporations, for applying it would require personifying the corporate entity.
297. See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with granting
modem business corporations unlimited access to free speech).
298. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (stating that
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In summary, an examination of the values and policies underlying
each constitutional right should be a threshold matter before a
corporation is deemed to be a "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such an examination would avoid the adoption of debated
corporate metaphors into constitutional jurisprudence, and would
parallel traditional constitutional interpretation. By examining the
values and policies underlying each right, the Court would ensure that
corporations are not granted constitutional rights meant only for natural
persons in our system of government. Under this test, a corporation
would only be granted a constitutional right if the reasons an individual
person is entitled to the right apply equally to a corporation. This test
would strengthen corporate constitutional jurisprudence by preventing
corporations from being presumptively granted constitutional rights
absent a showing that they are actually entitled to them.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the development of corporate personality doctrine has
had a dramatic effect on our America's economic system, legal system,
and society in general. Once conceived as a creature of the state, the
modern business corporation is now the ultimate legal actor, endowed
with most of the rights of individual citizens, yet with control over more
resources than any individual. This development occurred as the law
struggled to fit the corporate entity into the American legal tradition,
which focuses on individual relationships.
The Court has been engaged in the task of determining the proper
role and conception of the corporate entity since America's founding.
As the three major strains of corporate personality doctrine and their
variants have developed, the Court has shown an increasing willingness
to use them to analogize the corporate entity to the natural person
presumed by the Constitution. The Court has thus used these metaphors
to assimilate the corporation into the American legal tradition and to
grant corporations increasing constitutional rights. However, the
Court's methodology is inherently flawed, for the application of these
metaphors is a conclusion rather than a test. The foundational cases
contained no analysis of why a corporation should be treated as a natural
person. Moreover, the Court has never developed a satisfactory test to
address this preliminary question. Given these circumstances, the Court
should decline to adhere to stare decisis and should adopt a new test to
analyze corporations' constitutional rights.
the restriction focused on the distorting effects of immense aggregations and wealth through the
corporate entity).
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Before granting corporations a constitutional right, the Court should
examine the specific right at issue to discern the underlying values and
policies. After determining the purpose of a given right, the Court
should decline to grant corporations constitutional rights absent a
finding that corporations are entitled to the right for the same reasons an
individual person is. This test more closely parallels traditional
methods of constitutional interpretation and prevents constitutional
rights from being premised on debatable theories of corporate
"personality." This would strengthen the constitutional doctrine. By
following this analysis, the Court would ensure that corporations are
only granted constitutional rights when they are actually entitled to
them. In this manner, the Court can draw the appropriate distinction
between modern business corporations and individual citizens, thus
recognizing the proper place of the corporate entity in American
society.
